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Abstract
We develop a model to understand the trade–offs faced by an elected rep-
resentative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is
in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are
the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the smaller is
the fiscal leakage to undocumented immigrants via the welfare state. Empirical
evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of
our theoretical model.
JEL classification: F22, O51.
Keywords : Migration policy, Amnesties, Roll Call Votes.
“The 855-page Senate bill... contains a path to citizenship. Proponents avoid calling
it amnesty, even as they tout the moral imperative of bringing 11 million people out of
the shadows. Opponents wield the word as a weapon, decrying amnesty as a free pass to
lawbreakers...” Cindy Chang (2013) 1
1 Introduction
Growing migration pressures in the presence of restrictive immigration policies have made
illegal immigration – i.e. the movement of people across national borders in violation of the
immigration laws of destination countries – widespread. As a result, most rich destination
countries harbor today large populations of undocumented foreigners.2 Among host coun-
tries, the U.S. stands out as one the largest recipients of illegal immigrants (Dustmann and
Frattini 2013), and recent estimates suggest that in 2014, 11.3 million individuals, or 3.5% of
the total population, was made up by irregular migrants. The legal status of migrants clearly
reflects the policy stance of the destination country, both in terms of the ex–ante controls
introduced to discipline the flows, and the ex–post measures taken to grant legal status.
In particular, legalization programs, commonly known also as immigration amnesties, have
been the focus of much attention, and much controversy.
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade-offs faced by a politician in the decision to
support the introduction of an immigration amnesty. To address this question, we develop
a model in which immigration policy involves a minimum skill requirement,3 which cannot
be perfectly enforced,4 leading to the possible presence of illegal immigrants. To establish
1LA Times May 12, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/12/local/la-
me-amnesty-20130513.
2Throughout the paper we will use “irregular”, “illegal” and “undocumented” immigrants
as synonyms.
3See Czaika and Parsons (2017) for a recent analysis of the effects of skill selective migration
policies on the composition of migration flows.
4This is of course only one of the many features of the migration policies in place in
destination countries. We focus on it to simultaneously model the presence of legal and
illegal immigrants. The same objective could be achieved by introducing a policy taking the
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whether an amnesty is desirable, our analysis focuses on a novel cost–benefit calculus, in-
volving a potential welfare gain arising from the new labor market opportunities available
to legalized migrants, and a potential loss resulting from them gaining access to the welfare
state. More specifically, in our model the labor market is characterized by imperfect skill
matching between employers and employees, and by the presence of a formal sector, where
only legal migrants can find employment, and of an informal one, to which illegal immigrants
are restricted. As a result, some illegal workers who could have taken up a highly skilled job
in the formal sector, are prevented from doing so, leading to a potential output loss. The
role of the welfare state is captured by a simple redistributive mechanism consisting of a
proportional tax levied on the formal sector and of a lump–sum benefit paid to all natives
and legal migrants, whereas illegal immigrants are instead excluded from it.
We show that the incentives to support a legalization program are stronger, the greater is
the improvement in the labor market opportunities available to legalized workers as a result
of them gaining access to the formal sector. At the same time, since low-skilled legalized
foreign workers will gain access to welfare benefits, a larger transfer towards them, i.e. a
larger fiscal leakage, makes a legalization less desirable.
In the second part of the paper, we empirically assess the predictions of our model. To
this end, we study the determinants of the voting behavior of U.S. Representatives on the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA H.R. 3810) of 1986. Voting on IRCA is an ideal
testing ground for our theory for at least three reasons. First, the enactment of this bill re-
sulted in one of the largest legalization programs ever undertaken in the Western world: 2.8
million individuals – or 1.2 percent of the total population of the country – became entitled
to permanent residency, with long lasting consequences for the U.S. economy, and for the
political debate around immigration reform. Second, IRCA was a highly controversial bill,
which passed after years of negotiations with only 58% of the House supporting it, and with
considerable variability in the votes across space (even within the same state). Third, the
form of a migration quota as in Facchini and Testa (2010). For a discussion see Section 2.
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data at our disposal are unique as we can match the voting behavior of elected congressmen
to a wealth of constituency level characteristics. In particular, using information from the
INS Legalization Summary Tapes we know that between 70% and 80% of the participants
in IRCA’s legalization programs were from Mexico, and about 8% from El Salvador. Imple-
menting (and adapting) the procedure recently proposed by Borjas (2017) we identify likely
undocumented migrants among Mexicans and Salvadorean observed in the 1980 census.5
Using this information at the individual level, we then construct detailed measures of the
labor market mismatch of illegal immigrants before the legalization took place – based on
their degree of over-education in each two digit occupation – and of the fiscal leakage to
immigrants – based on the district’s fiscal exposure to immigration (Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter 2007) and on the extent of redistribution across districts. Our empirical analysis
shows that the drivers identified in the theoretical framework play a key role. In particular,
our preferred specification indicates that a 10 percentage points increase (about 50% of a
standard deviation) in the labor market mismatch suffered by illegal migrants leads on av-
erage to an increase of 4.3 percentage points in the probability of a representative voting in
favor of IRCA (an increase of about 7.3% at the sample mean). Furthermore, representatives
of districts facing high local fiscal exposure to immigrant legalization (13.1% of the total)
are 29.6 percentage points (51% at the sample mean) less likely to support IRCA than repre-
sentatives of districts characterized by a low fiscal leakage. Finally, a ten percent increase in
median family income in the district (about two thousand U.S. dollars, or half of a standard
deviation) is associated with a 7.4 percentage points (12.7% at the sample mean) decrease
in the probability of a representative supporting IRCA.
Besides the factors highlighted in our theoretical model, the existing literature has em-
phasized the role played by several drivers that might influence a representative’s voting
behavior on immigration reform. Thus, to assess the robustness of our findings, we account
for several additional individual– and constituency–level characteristics. While we find that
5See section 5 for more details.
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some of them matter, our main results are unaffected. The same holds true when we use an
alternative econometric specification, and account for the possibility of sample selection. Our
results confirm that the expected impact of labor market mismatch and of the redistribution
performed by the welfare state are robust drivers of support for IRCA.
This paper contributes to the small but growing literature on immigration amnesties.
Chau (2001) shows that legalizing undocumented workers can be part of an optimal mi-
gration policy package – together with internal and border controls – when there is a time
inconsistency problem because the government cannot commit to implement the ex-ante op-
timal frequency of internal controls. Importantly, in her model all workers share the same
skill level and all immigrants are ex–ante undocumented. They can become legal only as a
result of an amnesty.
Karlson and Katz (2003) develop a model of illegal immigration focusing instead on
the role of amnesties as a tool for governments to induce immigrants to self–select based on
ability. In particular, they emphasize that a legalization will offer skilled workers better labor
market opportunities. As a result, the latter might be enticed to migrate even as illegals, in
the hope that an ex–post legalization will improve their income opportunities.6 Differently
from Chau (2001) and Karlson and Katz (2003), besides considering heterogeneous workers
and firms, we allow for the co–existence of legal and illegal immigrants.7
Epstein and Weiss (2011) also study the desirability of legalization programs. In their
setting, immigrants can only enter the country illegally, and can become legal as the result
of an amnesty. Immigration is always costly from the destination country’s point of view,
and the cost depends only on the total number of immigrants, and not on their skill level.
Moreover, migrants earn the same wages irrespective of their status. Empirical evidence has
instead pointed out that the wages of legalized migrants do improve following an amnesty,
and so do wage growth and return to skill (Borjas and Tienda 1993, Kossoudji and Cobb-
6See Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for a recent survey on the economics of skilled migra-
tion.
7For a political economy model of immigration amnesties, see also Chau (2003).
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Clark 2002, Kaushal 2006 and Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael 2007). This is likely
due to an increase in the geographical and occupational mobility of legalized migrants and
in the quality of their job matches (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2011 and Steigleder and
Sparber 2015). More generally, the skill level of the illegal migrant population is likely to
be an important determinant of the welfare consequences of a legalization program, and
modeling this lies at the center of our analysis.8 The skill profile of illegal immigrants is
also at the hearth of the analysis of the labor market effects of an amnesty carried out by
Chassamboulli and Peri (2015). In particular, they build a general equilibrium search model
to show that a legalization has an adverse effect on the wages of unskilled native workers,
while instead having a broad positive effect of native skilled workers. Importantly, in their
setting the decision to support an amnesty is not modeled.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup,
whereas section 3 establishes the conditions for the desirability of a legalization. Section
4 outlines the debate around the introduction of IRCA, and section 5 describes the data
we use. Section 6 develops our empirical analysis. Section 7 assesses the robustness of our
results and section 8 concludes.
2 The model
To analyze the drivers of support for immigration amnesties, we consider a model with a
polity featuring D districts/constituencies. In the representative district, domestic produc-
tion factors and foreign workers are combined to produce a single good. To keep the analysis
simple, they are assumed to be complements, and are both required for positive output levels
to be generated.9 As a result, the presence of migrants in the labor market is necessarily
beneficial, generating the “gains from migration” that have been emphasized in the literature
8For a quantitative assessment of the effect of an amnesty in the United States, see
Machado (2013).
9At the same time, in our simple model legal and illegal migrants are assumed to be
substitutes of each other, as they compete for vacancies in the labor market.
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(Berry and Soligo 1969, Borjas 1995).10 Yet, the presence of a redistributive welfare state
implies that these gains must be traded off against the potential welfare losses induced by
the leakage of benefits to migrants.11
For simplicity, we will think of the domestic factor owners as entrepreneurs.12 There
are I potentially active firms in the constituency, each one of them indexed by i, with i
distributed according to the density function n(i) on the interval [0, 1]. Firms can be ranked
according to their skill intensity and a higher value of i indicates a higher skill requirement,
with 1 being the most skill-intensive firm. The mass of the domestic population is given by
N , where I ≥ N . A firm will become active if it is matched with a worker.
Potential immigrants differ in their ability, and are indexed by j, with j distributed
according to the density function m(j) on the interval [0, 1], with 1 being the highest skill
level. To capture in a simple fashion labor market imperfections, we use a random matching
framework whereby individual abilities and a vacancy’s skill requirement are not necessarily
perfectly combined and consequently some highly qualified workers might end up in low-skill
10Following for example Benhabib (1996), we could have instead set up a model with two
production factors, e.g. skilled and unskilled labor, in which natives and migrants supply
both types of inputs. In his setting, domestic and foreign skills are perfect substitutes. Still,
under the assumption that output is generated with a constant returns to scale neoclassical
production function, Benhabib shows that gains from migration occur, as long as the skill
composition differs between natives and migrants (Proposition 1 part (a)). The advantage of
such a framework would be to allow for the presence of redistributive effects of legalization
through the labor market. At the same time, since support for the legalization in our model
is based on its effect on aggregate welfare, the presence of these distributional effects would
not alter the main findings of the analysis, while making the functioning of the labor market
matching less transparent. Note also that several recent papers, using very different modeling
assumptions, have shown that receiving countries tend to experience an increase in welfare
due to the arrival of immigrants, thus providing broad support for the basic effect identified
in our model. This is true for example both in quantitative exercises based on heterogeneous
firm models a` la Melitz (di Giovanni et al. 2015) – and in labor market matching models
(Battisti et al. 2017).
11For evidence on the leakage of welfare state benefits from natives to migrants in the U.S.
context, see Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Borjas and Trejo (1991).
12We have chosen this terminology for expositional convenience, but we could as well think
of domestic factor owners simply as workers whose skills are combined in a firm with those
of the migrants to produce output, and our results would not be affected.
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jobs, some others may be unemployed, and/or some firms might not be able to find suitable
members of staff. Formally, if a migrant is employed, a match of value v(i, j) is created and
shared between natives and migrants, where
v(i, j) =

[1− (j − i)]v(j) if j ≥ i
0 if j < i.
(1)
Note that since higher values of j characterize more skilled individuals, it is reasonable
to assume that v(j), i.e. the maximum value of the match generated by a worker of skill
j, increases with j. At the same time, equation 1 implies that the value of the match for
worker j is maximized if he occupies a vacancy offered by a firm of type j. Furthermore, this
value is zero if a migrant of skill level j ends up in a job i for which he is under–qualified
(i.e. j < i) and finally, if a migrant of skill j obtains a job for which he is over–qualified (i.e.
j > i), then the value of the match is still positive, but smaller than the one that could be
achieved if i = j. The probability that individual j is matched to vacancy i is described by
the joint density function f(i, j).
A formal and an informal sector coexist in the economy, and we assume that on average
the former requires a more highly skilled labor force than the latter. This is consistent with
the evidence reported by Schneider (2011), who documents that the shadow economy is
particularly large in unskilled labor intensive industries such as construction, wholesale and
retail trade and hotels and restaurants. We model the different factor requirements of the
two sectors by assuming that firms with skill intensity above a given threshold i˜ represent the
formal economy, whereas firms with skill intensity below i˜ constitute the informal economy.
The status quo migration policy – common to all constituencies – involves a minimum
skill requirement j∗ for legal migrants, which cannot be perfectly enforced. The result is
that illegal immigration will emerge if the policy is always binding, i.e. if there are always
more migrants willing to enter than those accepted as legals. We will assume this to be the
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case throughout our analysis.13 Importantly, while legal migrants can work in both sectors,
illegal immigrants do not enjoy the same employment opportunities, and can work only in the
informal sector.14 Note that modeling the migration policy as a minimum skill requirement
enables us to capture an important difference between legal and illegal migrants, i.e. the
fact that the former are – on average – more skilled than the latter (see for instance Passel
2005 and Hanson 2007). Furthermore, skill selective immigration policies are becoming
increasingly widespread among many important destination countries, as documented by
Boeri et al. (2012).
The number of legal migrants, i.e. those whose skill level is above the threshold j∗,
is given by M(j∗, 1) =
∫ 1
j∗m(j)dj, whereas the number of illegal immigrants is given by
M(jill, j∗) =
∫ j∗
jill
m(j)dj, where jill is the exogenously given skill level of the least qualified
migrant worker entering the country illegally. If legal migrants are employed in the formal
sector, they generate a total expected income denoted by
V (j∗, 1; i˜, 1) =
∫ 1
j∗
∫ 1
i˜
v(i, j)f(i, j)didj, (2)
whereas if they end up in the informal sector, they generate a total expected income given
by
V (j∗, 1; 0, i˜) =
∫ 1
j∗
∫ i˜
0
v(i, j)f(i, j)didj. (3)
Illegal migrants can work only in the informal sector, i.e. for every illegal migrant j, with
j < j∗, v(i, j) = 0 if i > i˜. They generate an expected income given by
V (jill, j∗; 0, i˜) =
∫ j∗
jill
∫ i˜
0
v(i, j)f(i, j)didj. (4)
13See Mayda (2010) for evidence that migration policies in many destination countries are
likely to be binding.
14Notice that our results would not be affected if we allowed the two sectors to partially
overlap in terms of skill intensity, as long as illegal immigrants continue to be restricted in
their labor market opportunities.
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Our assumption that immigration policy is always binding results in jill < j∗, i.e. illegal
immigration always takes place. Moreover, to make the problem interesting, we impose that
jill < i˜ < j∗, i.e. that at least some illegal migrants are sufficiently skilled that in the
absence of restrictions to their employment opportunities, they could be employed in the
formal sector.15 The top portion of Figure 1 illustrates the status of migrants according to
their skill level, whereas the bottom one shows the breakdown of firms between those active in
the formal and those active in the informal sector, depending on their skill intensity. Natives
and migrants share the expected value of a match. Let α and β be the fractions which are
appropriated by each firm’s owner in the formal and the informal sectors, respectively, with
β ≥ α to capture the idea that the bargaining power of firms’ owners is likely to be larger
in the informal rather than in the formal sector.
The constituency is characterized by the presence of a redistributive welfare system, which
has important implications for the desirability of an immigration amnesty (Razin, Sadka,
and Swagel 2002). We assume that redistribution takes place by means of an exogenously
given proportional income tax τ and a lump-sum transfer b, which adjusts in order to keep
the budget balanced. All natives and legal immigrants in the formal sector contribute to the
welfare system, whereas both natives and migrants active in the informal sector do not. All
natives and legal migrants are entitled to receive the welfare state benefits, whereas illegal
migrants are not.16 The constituency’s budget is thus given by
τV (j∗, 1; i˜, 1) = b [N +M(j∗, 1)] . (5)
To capture the existence of a fiscal leakage from natives to immigrants (Borjas and Hilton
1996, Borjas and Trejo 1991, Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002 and Blau and Mackie 2016),
15This assumption is in line with the evidence reported in Kossoudji and Cobb–Clark (2002)
indicating that the wages of legalized migrants increase as a result of the legalization.
16Of course these are simplifying assumptions, but they capture the stylized facts that
the informal sector is often characterized by widespread tax evasion and legal and illegal
migrants differ in their net position towards the welfare state. See Camarota (2004).
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we consider the relationship between the average taxable income of natives and the average
taxable income of immigrants. For any j, the former is given by
Y N = α
V (j, 1; i˜, 1)
N
, (6)
whereas the latter is captured by
Y M = (1− α)V (j, 1; i˜, 1)
M(j, 1)
. (7)
The condition for the presence of a fiscal leakage is Y N > Y M , which, using equations 6 and
7 can be rewritten as
α
1− α >
N
M(j, 1)
. (8)
If at a given j equation 8 is satisfied, the implication is that, for any proportional tax rate
τ , on average natives will be net contributors to the welfare state, whereas immigrants will
be on average net receivers.17,18 At the same time, it might well be that some migrants are
net contributors and some natives end up on the receiving end of the welfare state.
17In particular, as pointed out by Blau and Mackie (2016), page 250: “In the United
States, first generation immigrants have historically exhibited lower skills and education
and, in turn, income relative to the native-born. Analyses of New Jersey and California
for The New Americans (National Research Council, 1997, pp. 292-293) concluded that the
estimated negative fiscal impacts during the periods 1989-90 and 1994-95, respectively, were
driven by three factors: (1) immigrant-headed households had more children than native
households on average, and so consumed more educational services on a per capita basis; (2)
immigrant-headed households were poorer than native households on average, thus making
them eligible to receive more state and locally funded income transfers; and (3) due to their
lower average incomes, immigrant-headed households paid lower state and local taxes.” In
a recent interview in the New York Times (“Immigrants aren’t taking American Jobs, New
Study Finds, September 21, 2016”) Professor Blau concluded that in the U.S. even today
“The first generation of newcomers generally cost governments more than they contribute in
taxes, with most of the costs falling on state and local governments, mainly because of the
expense of educating the children of immigrant families.”
18Allowing for a differential tax treatment between entrepreneurs and workers, and in par-
ticular assuming a higher income tax rate for entrepreneurs, will make it more likely for
native entrepreneurs to be net contributors to the welfare state, and make the fiscal leakage
more severe.
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3 When is a legalization desirable?
In this section we determine the conditions under which a legalization program is desirable
from the point of view of a policy maker who maximizes the aggregate welfare of the natives
in her constituency.19 If a legalization is introduced, it will involve all illegal immigrants,20
and will have the following effects. First, legalized migrants will have access to the full set
of occupations, i.e. those in the formal and those in the informal sector. At the same time,
they will receive benefits from the welfare state, but they will contribute to it only if they
work in the formal sector. In other words, legalized migrants share the same rights and
obligations as the natives.
The welfare of the constituency is denoted by wz, with z ∈ {L, NL}, where L stands for
legalization and NL for the lack of it. If no legalization is implemented, at the status quo
policy j∗ we have
wNL = α(1− τ)V (j∗, 1; i˜, 1) + βV (jill, 1; 0, i˜) + bNLN (9)
with bNL = b determined according to equation 5. Thus, welfare depends linearly on the net
income accruing to the natives from the employment of legal migrants in the formal sector
(first term on the right hand side), in the informal sector (second term) and on the lump-sum
transfer received by the natives (third term). If a legalization is introduced we have instead
wL = α(1− τ)V (jill, 1; i˜, 1) + βV (jill, 1; 0, i˜) + bLN, (10)
19The process through which the aggregation of individual preferences takes place is ob-
viously more complex, but welfare maximization is a useful theoretical benchmark. In our
empirical analysis we take that into account, for example, by exploring the role played by
pressure groups.
20We do not consider selective amnesties, as this would complicate the analysis, without
changing the main determinants of the introduction of legalization programs. Moreover, the
conditions we uncover for the desirability of general amnesties are more stringent than those
which would apply to the implementation of selective measures.
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with
bL =
τV (jill, 1; i˜, 1)
N +M(jill, 1)
(11)
indicating the lump-sum transfer paid out by the welfare state when all migrants have access
to it. Note that when a legalization is implemented (see equation 10) all migrants present in
the constituency can be employed in the formal sector (first term in equation 10), but some
of them will still end up in the informal one (second term in equation 10). We can then
establish the following result:
Proposition 1 A legalization is supported when wL > wNL. This condition is more likely
to be satisfied the bigger is the gain to aggregate income accruing to natives by allowing
legalized workers access to a broader range of occupations and the smaller is the fiscal leakage
to legalized migrants.
Proof. Subtracting equation 9 from equation 10 we obtain the following expression, which
captures the incentives faced by the policy maker to support a legalization:
wL − wNL = α(1− τ)V (jill, j∗; i˜, 1) +N(bL − bNL). (12)
A legalization will be supported when wL−wNL > 0. The sign of wL−wNL is determined by
the relative size of the two terms on the right hand side of 12. The first term, which is positive,
captures the labor market matching channel: the bigger is V (jill, j∗; i˜, 1), i.e. the bigger is
the increase in expected output appropriated by natives by granting legalized migrants access
to the formal economy, the more likely it is that a legalization will be supported. The second
term captures the change in the redistributive benefit received by the natives following the
legalization, and denotes the effect of the welfare state on the desirability of a legalization.
In the presence of a fiscal leakage from the natives to the immigrants, i.e. equation 8 is
satisfied at j = jill, we have that bL < bNL: since all immigrants working in the formal
sector are fully engaged in the welfare state and their taxable income is on average lower
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than that of natives, the lump-sum transfer paid out by the welfare state decreases in the
event of a legalization. The second term is therefore negative. Using equation 5 and 11, we
can rewrite (bL− bNL) as τN
[
V (jill,1;˜i,1)
N+M(jill,1)
− V (j∗,1;˜i,1)
N+M(j∗,1)
]
. For given τ , the difference (bL− bNL)
depends, thus, on the extent to which the average taxable income in the economy declines
after the legalization. The larger is the decline, and therefore the stronger the fiscal leakage
from natives to migrants, the less likely it is that the legalization is supported.21
Summing up, our theoretical model indicates that, for a policy maker who maximizes the
aggregate welfare of natives in her constituency, the incentives to legalize are stronger the
bigger is the gain to expected aggregate (net) income brought about by granting legalized
workers access to all the available employment opportunities, and the smaller is the fiscal
leakage due to entitling lower–skilled legalized foreign workers to welfare benefits. In the
remainder of the paper, we investigate the empirical relevance of the labor market and
welfare state channels in explaining the incentives to support a legalization program.
4 IRCA
To assess the implications of our theoretical model, we study the determinants of the voting
behavior of U.S. representatives on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of
1986. IRCA introduced the largest immigrant legalization in U.S. history, which enabled 2.8
million undocumented immigrants to gain permanent legal status.
To understand the context in which IRCA was introduced, recall that U.S. immigration
policy was fundamentally changed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which
abolished the national–origin quota system introduced in the Twenties. Instead, a quota
of 170,000 was introduced for the Eastern hemisphere, with a cap of 20,000 admissions
for each individual country. Moreover, a new quota for the Western hemisphere – which
21Note that we can rearrange the terms in 12 to identify a threshold at which the sign of
(wL − wNL) changes. Namely, (wL − wNL) > 0 if:
V (jill,1;˜i,1)
N+M(jill,1)
− V (j∗,1;˜i,1)
N+M(j∗,1)
V (jill,j∗ ;˜i,1) <
α(1−τ)
τN
.
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had been exempted under the old regime – was also devised, setting an overall limit of
120,000 admissions, but without an individual country cap. Following the first oil crisis
and the ensuing stagflation, Congress introduced a series of restrictive immigration policy
measures, ranging from provisions for employer sanctions to tackle the growing employment
of undocumented immigrants, to the extension of the applicability of the 20,000 per-country
cap to migrants from the Western hemisphere, a measure aimed at limiting immigration
from Mexico (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011 and Gimpel and Edwards 1999). In 1978 the
two quotas were merged in an overall worldwide total of 290,000 permanent admissions, with
a 20,000 limit for each individual country (Hatton 2015).
To address the emerging concerns about the growing size of the undocumented immigrant
population, President Carter and Congress, pressed by Senator Kennedy and Representative
Eilberg, set up the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) (LeMay
2006), which started its activities in 1979, and reported its findings to President Reagan
in 1981. SCIRP was established – along the lines of the Dillingham Commission seventy
years earlier – as a special bipartisan committee in charge of studying ways of reforming
American migration policy. The Commission’s final report recommended tougher measures
to address undocumented immigration, while at the same time, adopting a more open stance
towards legal migrants. Furthermore, it argued in favor of the introduction of a legalization
program for the existing stock of undocumented immigrants, pointing out that this would be
“consistent with American interests” and that “qualified aliens would be able to contribute
more to U.S. society once they came into open” (Select Commission on Immigration and
Refugee Policy 1981, p. 74).
After the publication of SCIRP’s final report, the chairmen of the Senate and House Judi-
ciary Subcommittees on Immigration, senator Alan Simpson and congressman Romano Maz-
zoli took the initiative to incorporate some of its recommendations in the Simpson-Mazzoli
bill (H.R. 1510 ), which was introduced in Congress in 1982. The first major provision of
the bill was to make it illegal to knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants, intro-
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ducing also penalties for those employing illegal aliens. A second major component was the
requirement for employers to attest their employees’ immigration status. Last, but not least,
it granted an amnesty to certain agricultural seasonal workers and immigrants who entered
the U.S. before January 1, 1982 and had lived there continuously. The bill proposal was -
from its initial introduction on the Senate floor in 1982 - very controversial, as the provision
of sanctions for employers drew strong opposition from liberal democrats, business groups
and Latino pressure groups. As a result, the measure was withdrawn. Further consideration
to the bill was given during the subsequent Congress, but the measure was finally voted upon
in the same form by the two chambers only in 1986, and was signed into law by President
Reagan as the Immigration Reform and Control Act (H.R. 3810, IRCA).
The main difference with the original Simpson-Mazzoli bill was the addition of a tem-
porary program for agricultural workers, which was requested by the agricultural lobby and
strongly opposed by organized labor (Gimpel and Edwards 1999). As a result, IRCA included
provisions for two large immigration amnesties: the Legally Authorized Workers (LAW) and
the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) programs. The LAW program was open to aliens
who had resided continuously in the U.S. since at least January 1, 1982, and allowed more
than 1.6 million immigrants to achieve legal status. The SAW program provided instead a
pathway to legal status for undocumented aliens who worked in the agricultural sector for
at least 90 days during the year ending May 1, 1986, and enabled the legalization of over 1.2
million unauthorized immigrants.22 Several studies on the effects of these amnesties show
that newly legalized immigrants saw, on average, increases in their wages, wage growth, and
returns to skills (e.g., Borjas and Tienda 1993; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael 2007) due to an increase in their occupational mobility
(out of traditionally “illegal occupations”), and to better labor market matches (Amuedo-
22Note that workers legalized as a result of SAW were not constrained to remain in the
agricultural sector after the legalization. In fact, fears that the legalization would lead to
significant shortages of agricultural workers led to the introduction of a provision for guest
workers in case of subsequent labor shortages.
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Dorantes and Bansak 2011 and Steigleder and Sparber 2015). Interestingly, the existing
evidence indicates that there was no discernible increase in the legalized migrants geograph-
ical mobility (Barcellos 2010). This is true for both Mexican and other Latin American
legalized immigrants, and for all different skill groups.
5 Data
The construction of our dataset draws on a number of different sources.
We obtained information on individual representatives’ voting behavior on IRCA from
the VOTEVIEW project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997), which
also reports the congressman’s name, party affiliation, state of residence, and congressional
district. We rely instead on ICPSR Study number 7803 and the data base built by Swift
et al. (2000) for information on representatives’ age and gender. Our dependent variable is
a dummy taking a value of 1 if the representative has voted in favor of IRCA and 0 if he has
voted against.
The empirical literature has documented that the legal status has a significant impact on
the set of labor market matches that are available to migrants (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak
2011). Our model suggests that an amnesty is more likely to be introduced the larger is the
increase in output induced by the legalization. This depends on the quality of the initial job
match of illegal immigrants, as measured by their degree of over-education. For this reason
we construct, for each congressional district, indicators of undocumented immigrants’ over–
education based on data from the 1980 Census of Population. In particular, we consider
the distribution of educational attainment of workers for each occupation, and classify as
over–educated employees who have a level of education (adjusted for the quality of schooling
in the home country) above the district–specific mean of natives in that occupation. We
then use this measure to construct the district–level share of illegal workers that are over-
educated.23 Specifically, we proceed as follows. First, we transform the Census variable
23For a discussion of this type of indices see Verdugo and Verdugo (1988) and Chevalier
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on educational qualification into years of education, accounting for differences in quality
of education between the U.S. and the countries of origin of illegal immigrants as outlined
below. Second, we compute, for every two–digit occupational category,24 the mean of the
number of years of education for native workers. Third, for each employee we construct a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if his/her level of education is above the mean of natives’
education in their occupation and 0 otherwise. Fourth, we compute for each district, and
separately for natives and illegal immigrants, the mean value of the dummies defined above,
which represents the district–level share of over–educated natives and illegal immigrants. A
higher value of the over–education index for illegal immigrants suggests a worse allocation
of their skills across occupations, and therefore the possibility of larger output gains from
re–matching, which make a legalization more likely to be implemented. The corresponding
measure for natives captures instead the general level of skill mismatch prevailing in the local
labor market. As a robustness check, we also compute a measure of over–education based
on deviations from the median.
As standard sources do not report information on immigrants’ legal status, we cannot
directly observe their degree of over–education. However, we can proxy it taking advantage of
some features of the data, and of the characteristics of the foreign population in the U.S. As it
has been pointed out by Hanson (2006), there is “...abundant evidence that illegal immigrants
are represented in official household surveys, including the U.S. Census of Population...”
(page 873), and in fact Warren and Passel (1987) estimate that 2 million undocumented
aliens were recorded in the 1980 U.S. Census. Furthermore, as argued by Borjas and Tienda
(1993) and Baker (2010), between 70% and 80% of the participants in IRCA’s legalization
programs were from Mexico and about 8% from El Salvador. In other words, these two
countries account for the vast majority of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. in 1986.25
(2003).
24As a result, we consider a total of 82 occupations.
25These figures are broadly in line with the estimates of Warren and Passel (1987) and
Passel and Woodrow (1987).
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Additionally, Warren and Passel (1987) estimate that 49% of the 2.3 million Mexicans and
57% of the 89 thousand Salvadorians recorded in the 1980 Census were undocumented. In
order to identify in our data individuals that are likely to be undocumented immigrants
we therefore focus on natives of Mexico and El Salvador, and adapt the strategy recently
proposed by Borjas (2017). Specifically, we define as illegal immigrants all individuals born
in Mexico and El Salvador who are observed in the 1980 U.S. census, except for those who
satisfy at least one of the following conditions: 1) are U.S. citizens; 2) received, during
the previous year, income from Social Security pensions, survivors benefits, or permanent
disability insurance, as well as U.S. government Railroad Retirement insurance payments;
3) are veterans, or currently in the Armed Forces; 4) work in the government sector; 5) are
employed in occupations that require some form of licensing (such as physicians, registered
nurses, air traffic controllers, and lawyers); 6) are married to a legal immigrant or citizen.
Following this procedure we identify 57% of all Mexicans and Salvadorian immigrants in the
data as likely to be illegals, a figure in line with the estimates of Warren and Passel (1987).
Warren and Passel (1987) also argue that “...undocumented immigrants appear to have
a geographic distribution similar to legally admitted aliens...” (page 391). The latter result
is confirmed in Figure 2 where we show that the number of IRCA applicants in each con-
gressional district – our best guess of the undocumented population in 198626 – is highly
correlated with the stock of immigrants from Mexico and El Salvador which we have iden-
tified as likely to be illegals from the 1980 Census.27 All this evidence suggests that our
constructed indicator is a good proxy for illegal status in all U.S. congressional districts in
1986. For this reason our measure of over-education is built using information on likely
illegal Mexicans and Salvadorians observed in the 1980 Census.
26To this end we have used data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Legal-
ization Summary Tapes (LST), kindly provided by Scott Baker. See Baker (2015) for more
details.
27Furthermore, a linear regression of the logarithm of the district-level stock of IRCA
applicants on a constant and the logarithm of the stock of likely illegal immigrants delivers
an estimated slope of .8 with a standard error of 0.034, and an R2 of 0.6.
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As properly quantifying immigrant skills is key to our analysis, in constructing our mea-
sure of over-education we must take into account that there might be significant differences
in the performance of school systems across countries, and in particular between immigrant
origins and the United States.28 In fact, these differences might make the direct comparison
of educational attainment of natives and foreign born problematic. To address this issue,
and following Razin and Wahba (2015), we have thus adjusted our measure of educational
attainment for likely illegal immigrants taking advantage of recent work on cross–country
comparisons of educational systems. In particular, in a recent contribution Hanushek and
Woessmann (2012) use several internationally comparable student achievement tests carried
out in 64 countries between 1964 and 2003 to develop a common, time–invariant metric for
the distribution of educational achievement across countries. Their result indicate that the
cognitive skills of Mexican students are on average 0.815 those of U.S. students over this
time period.29 This ratio can be interpreted as an – admittedly rough – macro measure
of the relative “quality” of education in Mexico vis a` vis the United States (see also Razin
and Wahba 2015), and used to obtain the number of years of “U.S.–equivalent” education
obtained by a Mexican migrant. As comparable data are not available for El Salvador, we
use data for Mexico to adjust the educational attainment of migrants born in that country
too. As we have pointed out, the indicator constructed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012)
is an average over many years. As educational best practices have spread across countries
in recent years, it might well be the case that U.S.-Mexico differences in school quality were
28We would like to thank one of the referees for raising this issue. Note also that English
language proficiency might affect the ability of the individual to fully take advantage of
her human capital in the destination country. Our data indicate though that only 25% of
the likely illegals did not speak English in 1980. Moreover, language proficiency is a time
varying individual characteristic and legalized migrants - not facing a deportation threat
and thus being able to stay longer in the destination country - will have greater incentives
to acquire proficiency in the local language (see Dustmann and Gorlach 2016 for a review).
As a result, the legalization program will likely improve their labor market match by both
making new jobs in the formal sector available, and by increasing their incentives to acquire
local language skills.
29See Table 11, Appendix B of the paper.
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larger in the 1960s and 1970s than in more recent decades. As our analysis focuses on immi-
grants observed in the 1980 U.S. Census, we have thus assessed the robustness of our results
by considering two alternative and lower coefficients of adjustment (0.790 and 0.765).
The second main prediction of our theoretical model is that, within a given constituency,
a larger fiscal leakage to legalized migrants makes an amnesty less desirable. To obtain a
measure of the fiscal leakage, we focus on the revenue side of the budget and look at the
tax burden on American households. The latter depends on the amount of both local, state
and federal taxes. Legalization is more likely to be opposed in those areas with a relatively
high level of local tax burden, and a significant number of undocumented immigrants, since
in those areas the redistribution from natives to immigrants is more likely to happen and
to be sizable. At the same time, the potential cost of legalization for state and federal
coffers is borne by residents of all districts, even those with virtually no undocumented
immigrants. For these reasons, in our empirical analysis we capture the working of the
welfare state channel in two complementary ways. First, we measure the local fiscal leakage
associated with a legalization with a dummy variable that identifies districts characterized
by a high level of local tax payments, and by a high presence of undocumented immigrants,
since both contribute to determining the scope of the fiscal leakage. Specifically, from the
Data Base on Historical Finances of Local Governments: “County Area Finances”30 we
calculate the per capita revenues of local governments31 at the county level in 1982, and
aggregate them up at the congressional district level.32 We then define a dummy variable
that identifies the districts above the mean (or alternatively above the 75th percentile)
of the distribution of per capita revenues of local governments. Similarly, we construct a
30See Bureau of the Census (1982).
31Local governments comprise counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and
independent school districts.
32In particular, we compute weighted averages based on the share of each county in the
total population of the district. This applies also to counties split across more than one
district. In this case a county’s population is attributed to a particular district, assuming
that the former is geographically uniformly distributed. For a similar approach see for
instance Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2012).
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dummy variable that identifies districts characterized by a share of likely illegal Mexican and
Salvadorian immigrants in the total population above the mean, or, alternatively, above the
75th percentile. We then combine this information in a “High local fiscal leakage” indicator,
which takes a value of one if both of the previous indicators are equal to one, and zero
otherwise.33 Second, to capture potential fiscal spill–over effects across jurisdictions, both
within and across states, we include a measure of the congressional district income (the
median or mean) from the Congressional District Data Files of Lublin (1997) and Adler
(2003). The underlying idea is that ceteris paribus, high income districts are more likely to
be penalized by the redistributive flows to migrants triggered by the legalization program –
taking place both within and across states.
In some specifications we will also control for additional factors that may drive a repre-
sentative’s voting behavior. First, we account for her/his party affiliation, age, gender and
ethnic background. Second, we control for an array of district level characteristics. We start
by accounting for the ethnic composition of each district including the share of the popula-
tion with an African-American or Hispanic background, taken from the 1980 U.S. Census.
Next, we control for a measure of immigrant penetration in the district, i.e. the ratio of
foreign to natives in the district’s working age (16–65) population. We also construct a vari-
able measuring the share of the population living in urban areas, to account for potential
differences between rural and urban areas in attitudes toward immigrants’ legalization. A
district’s factor endowment has been shown (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011) to play an im-
portant role in shaping policy preferences, and we measure it with the district–level share of
individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree in the total population over 25 years of age. We
additionally include the district–level unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of individuals
looking for a job out of the total labor force. We also control for the sectoral composition
of the local economy, using the share of individuals in the labor force employed in each one
digit sector.34 Finally, since pressure groups may play a significant role in determining rep-
33For a similar procedure, see Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007).
34These are: agriculture, construction, manufacturing, transport, communication, trade,
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resentatives’ voting behavior, in some robustness checks we proxy for their influence using
data on labor and corporate Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions, provided by
the Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/). As PAC contributions measure
lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we construct two indicator variables taking
a value of one if the politician has received contributions that are at or above the eightieth
percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.35
We report summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis in Table 1. As we
can see, IRCA was a controversial measure, and cleared the House with a 58 to 42 percent
majority. On average, the share of undocumented immigrants who are over–educated in a
district is around 13 percent, whereas the corresponding figure for natives is approximately
55 percent. This difference can be explained by the fact that undocumented migrants are
substantially less educated than natives – on average they have only 6.5 years of ”quality-
adjusted” education, compared with 13.35 for the natives. As a result, they are less likely
than natives to be employed in occupations which require less education than the level they
have attained. Note though that, ceteris paribus, undocumented migrants are still more
likely than natives to be mismatched in the labor market. To see this point, using a sample
of natives and undocumented immigrants, we run a regression of the over–education dummy
on a constant, years of education and an indicator for illegal status. The specification gives
an estimated coefficient on the “illegal status” dummy of .14, with a standard error of 0.002,
which indicates that undocumented immigrants are 14 percentage points more likely to be
over–educated than natives with the same level of education. Finally, the share of districts
exhibiting high local fiscal leakage is approximately 13 percent of the total and the median
family income is approximately 20,055 U.S. dollars, with a standard deviation of 4,003.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the main forces at work in our model. In particular, Figure
finance, business and repair services, entertainment, health and education, other professional
services and public administration. Details on the data construction are available from the
National Historic Geographical Information System website, https://www.nhgis.org/ and
Bureau of Labor Statistics website http://www.bls.gov/iag/home.htm.
35See Facchini, Frattini, and Signorotto (2013) for a similar strategy.
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3 reports a map of Florida’s congressional districts during the 99th congress.36 Consider
districts 7 and 8. While more than 14% of the undocumented residents of district 7 are
over–educated according to our definition,37 the same is true for none of the undocumented
residents of district 8. Our theoretical model suggests that the incentives to legalize will be,
ceteris paribus, higher in district 7 than in district 8. In fact, the representative of district
8, Bill Young voted against IRCA, while congressman Sam Gibbons, representing district
7, voted in favor. Consider now Figure 4, which reports instead a map of California’s
congressional districts. District 10 is characterized by a high local fiscal leakage, and by
a median per capita income at the 77th percentile. District 18 has instead a low local
fiscal leakage and a considerably lower median per capita income, below the 20th percentile.
Interestingly, congressman Don Edwards – representing district 10 – voted against IRCA,
whereas congressman Richard Lehman – representing district 18 – supported it, as suggested
by our theoretical model. While Figures 3 and 4 uncover some interesting patterns, in
the remainder of this paper we will systematically study their role in shaping individual
congressmen voting behavior on this important bill.
6 Empirical analysis
Our model identifies two drivers that play a role in shaping support for the introduction of
an amnesty. It suggests that an amnesty is more desirable the higher is the share of over–
educated illegal immigrants, since this leads to a larger expected output gain associated to
the legalization. At the same time, the more redistributive is the welfare state, the less
desirable is the legalization, as the fiscal leakage to migrants is more severe. To assess these
36The map has been extracted from Lewis, DeVine, Pitcher, and Martis (2013), retrieved
from http : //cdmaps.polisci.ucla.edu on October 9, 2015.
37As a result, district 7 is at the 88th percentile of the distribution.
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predictions, we estimate the following logit model:
Prob(V oted = 1|Zd) = F (β1IllegalsOverEdud + β2Highlocalfiscleakd+
+β3Medianincomed +Rdδ +Xdλ+ Is)
(13)
where V oted is a dummy variable indicating whether the representative of district d has voted
in favor of IRCA; IllegalsOverEdud is the share of likely illegal Mexican and Salvadorian
workers in district d that are over–educated, which proxies for the share of over–educated
illegal immigrants; Highlocalfiscleakd is the “High local fiscal leakage” measure defined in
section 5 and Medianincomed is the median family income in the district. Rd is a vec-
tor of control variables which includes representatives’ characteristics (party affiliation, age,
gender and an indicator for whether the representative is Hispanic) and Xd is instead a
vector of district–level controls, including economic (the share of native workers that are
over–educated, skill ratio, unemployment rate and share of workers employed in each one
digit sector), residential (share of urban population), and ethnic characteristics (share of
immigrants, share of African American and Hispanic residents). Finally, Is are state dum-
mies that account for unobserved state–specific factors. F (x) = 1
1+exp(x)
is the distribution
function of the logistic.
Table 2 contains our main findings. In column (1) we start with a parsimonious specifi-
cation that includes only our main explanatory variables and state fixed effects. The results
show that there exists a positive and statistically significant relationship between the share of
over–educated illegal immigrants in a district and the probability of a representative voting
in favor of IRCA. This is consistent with the prediction of our model that a larger mismatch
between undocumented immigrants’ skills and their job increases the likelihood that a repre-
sentative will support a legalization program. As for the role of the welfare state, the results
in column (1) indicate that a greater welfare leakage towards immigrants – as captured by
our two complementary measures – has a negative impact on support for an amnesty, but
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this effect is statistically significant only at the local level.38
As pointed out in the literature, several other factors might explain the support for im-
migration policy reform (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011) and, as a result, our parsimonious
specification might suffer from an omitted variable bias. For instance, Democratic districts
are likely to exhibit both higher local taxes, and express a representative who is in favor of
IRCA. If this is the case, then the omission of a representative’s party affiliation biases the
estimated effect of High local fiscal leakage towards 0. Furthermore, a representative’s His-
panic background might affect his/her support for legalization. For this reason, in column
(2) we augment our basic specification to include a series of representative–level controls
such as age, gender, Hispanic background and an indicator for whether he is a Democrat.
Interestingly, we find that Democratic representatives have a 37.9 percentage points higher
probability of supporting IRCA than their Republican counterparts, even within the same
state. We do not find instead a significant effect for the representative’s ethnicity. Further-
more, the estimated effect of High local fiscal leakage becomes considerably more negative
and is more precisely estimated.
In column (3) we additionally control for a set of district–level characteristics. We find
that representatives of districts characterized by a higher share of the population living in
urban areas are more likely to support IRCA. Similarly, our results indicate that repre-
sentatives of more skilled labor abundant districts are also more in favor of the amnesty,
confirming previous findings in the literature suggesting that complementarities between the
skills of natives and immigrants play an important role in explaining support for migration
liberalization (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011). Finally, we find that representatives of dis-
tricts characterized by a larger share of African Americans in the population are less likely
38Note that the model is estimated on 347 observations, despite the fact that 396 rep-
resentatives voted on IRCA, because in 49 instances there is no within-state variation in
direction of vote, and thus these observations are dropped in logit maximum likelihood
estimations. The states that are dropped are: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
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to support the legalization programs. A possible explanation is represented by the fact
that this group is the most likely to face direct competition by legalized migrants in the
labor market. We find also some evidence that representatives of districts characterized by
a larger Hispanic population are less likely to support this initiative, although the coefficient
is not significant. Our specification also controls for the general labor market mismatch
in the native population, and we find that representatives of districts characterized by less
efficient labor markets were more likely to support IRCA. Turning to our key explanatory
variables, controlling for additional district characteristics strengthens the empirical support
for our model. In particular, the estimated effect of median family income becomes consid-
erably more negative and statistically significant. In our last specification in column (4) we
additionally control for the distribution of employment across industrial sectors in a given
district. Our main results are unaffected.
Summarizing, our empirical findings provide strong support to the predictions of the
theoretical model. In terms of the magnitudes of the effects, our preferred specification
in column (4) indicates that an increase by ten percentage points in the share of over–
educated illegals (about 50% of a standard deviation) leads on average to an increase of 4.3
percentage points in the probability of a representative voting in favor of IRCA (an increase
of about 7.3% at the sample mean); at the same time, representatives of districts facing
high local fiscal exposure to immigrant legalization (13.1% of the total) are 29.6 percentage
points (51% at the sample mean) less likely to support IRCA; finally, a ten percent increase
in median family income in the district (about two thousand USD, or half of a standard
deviation) is associated with a 7.4 percentage points (12.7% at the sample mean) decrease
in the probability of a representative supporting IRCA.
7 Robustness Checks
In this section we assess the robustness of our results in a number of different ways.
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We start in Table 3 by experimenting with alternative definitions of our key explanatory
variables, using the specification in column (4) of Table 2 as the benchmark, which, to sim-
plify comparisons, is reported in column (1).39 In columns (2), (3) and (4) we use alternative
definitions of the over–education index. In column (2) we classify as over–educated individu-
als with a ”quality-adjusted” level of education higher than the median of their occupation,
rather than the mean, as in our main specification; in columns (3) and (4), instead, we com-
pute the over–education index applying a higher discount factor to illegals’ education (.790
and .765 rather than .815, respectively). We do so to account for the possibility that – as
educational best practices have spread across countries in recent years, the data by Hanushek
and Woessmann (2012) might be understating the differences in school quality between the
United States and Mexico in the Sixties and Seventies, when the undocumented migrants we
observe in the 1980 Census received their schooling. Results with all three alternative indices
closely resemble those of the benchmark. In columns (5), (6) and (7) we use alternative mea-
sures of the extent of local redistribution. First, in columns (5) and (6) we redefine our High
local fiscal leakage indicator, varying the condition on immigrant concentration (column 5)
or the condition on per capita revenues of local governments (column 6). In particular, in
column (5) we characterize a district as having “high illegal immigration” if it has a share
of likely illegal immigrants in the top 25% of the districts (column 5), rather than above the
mean as in our benchmark case, whereas in column (6) we require the per capita revenues
of local governments to be above the 75th percentile, rather than above the mean as in our
benchmark definition. In column (7), we instead rely on mean, rather than median family
income to capture redistribution at the state and federal level. The results are qualitatively
unaffected.
In Table 4, we report results with alternative or additional control variables, while keeping
the definition of our main explanatory variables as in the benchmark. First, in columns
39Note that we omit the coefficients for the individual and district level characteristics to
make the table more readable. Note though that the patterns identified for these controls in
column (4) of Table 2 continue to hold throughout.
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(1) and (2), we experiment with different measures of the ideological orientation of the
representative. In column (1) we replace democratic party affiliation with the normalized
DW nominate score – which increases in an individual’s conservative orientation, whereas
in column (2) we use the ADA score, which assesses every legislator on a scale from 0 to
100, with higher figures assigned to more liberal politicians.40 As expected, we still find that
more liberal–leaning representatives are more likely to support IRCA, while the estimates
of our main coefficients are not affected. In column (3) we additionally control for the share
of democratic votes in the 1984 congressional election. This does not play a significant role,
and does not affect our main results.
In columns (4) and (5) we replace our measure of a district’s skill composition with
the ratio of high school graduates and college graduates to high school dropouts (column
4) and the ratio of individuals employed in high versus low skilled occupations (column
5). Our results are unaffected. In column (6) we replace the immigrants/natives ratio
in the district’s working age population with a more flexible functional form specification,
i.e. the (logarithm) of the number of immigrant and native residents in the working age
population. Once again, our results are not affected. Immigration amnesties may be more
welcome in constituencies characterized by over-educated illegal migrants, just because more
educated foreign workers may become better citizens (e.g. less prone to criminal behavior or
more willing to assimilate), and not because they may generate higher expected output via
rematching in the labor market. To investigate this possibility, in column (7) we report results
from a regression where we include a measure of the relative education of illegal immigrants
and natives in each district as a control variable, in addition to over–education. We measure
40The DW-nominate measure is provided by the VOTEVIEW project, whereas the ADA
score is constructed by the American for Democratic Action, a lobby group. The main
difference between the former and the latter is that the ADA score uses only votes on a
sub-sample of bills cast in each congress, whereas the DW nominate score employs every roll
call vote in each congress, and is based on a more sophisticated estimation procedure. The
ADA score is not available for representatives of Texas 1st and Louisiana’s 8th congressional
districts because these representatives were elected in a 1985 by-election and thus did not
take part in enough votes to construct their score.
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it as the ratio between the ”quality-adjusted” mean years of education of illegal immigrants
and those of natives.41 This ratio has a positive and significant impact on the probability
of voting in favor of an amnesty, indicating that, indeed, representatives of districts with a
more educated undocumented population are more likely to support legalization. However,
the inclusion of this control does not affect the estimates of our coefficients of interest, and
of over-education in particular.
In our preferred specification, we include controls for the ethnic composition of the district
(share of African American and share of Hispanics in the population), to account for the effect
that the votes of ethnic minorities may have on the representative’s decision. However, the
share of Hispanics in a district may be correlated with the district’s share of undocumented
immigrants, and thus capture more than the simple effect of ethnicity on votes. For this
reason, in column (8) we have also included as an additional regressor the share of likely
illegal Mexican and Salvadorian immigrants in the district’s population. The estimated effect
of such a share turns out to be positive, but not statistically significant. More importantly, its
inclusion does not significantly affect the estimates of either our main coefficients of interest,
or of the share of Hispanics in the district.
So far in our analysis we have accounted for the presence of potential cross–jurisdiction
fiscal spillovers by controlling for a district’s median family income. By doing so we capture
an “average” effect, occurring both because of redistribution carried out at the federal and at
the state level. To account more precisely for within–state fiscal externalities, in columns (9)
and (10) we introduce two additional measures, following the same logic developed to con-
struct our main fiscal leakage indicator. In particular, in column (9), we control for a “state
fiscal spillover” indicator which, for a given district, takes a value of one if two conditions
are met: (i) the share of districts within the state -excluding the one under consideration-
with local per capita revenues above the national mean is greater than the average share
nation-wide; (ii) the state hosts a share of illegal immigrants above the national mean. In
41In the 16 districts where there are no illegal immigrants in our sample we have set this
ratio to zero. The model also includes a dummy variable that identifies these districts.
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column (10) we deploy instead an alternative measure which, for a given district, is equal to
the share of districts within the state -excluding the one under consideration- with local per
capita revenues above the national mean if the state hosts a share of illegal immigrants above
the national mean, and zero otherwise. The two controls are not statistically significant and
the coefficients of our main explanatory variables are unaffected.
Finally, since pressure groups may play a significant role in determining representatives’
voting behavior, in column (11) we proxy for their influence using data on labor and corporate
Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions. As PAC contributions measure lobbying
effort on a variety of different issues, we construct two indicator variables (PacCorporate
and PacLabor) taking a value of one if the politician has received contributions that are
at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.42
Interestingly, our results show that larger contributions by business–related lobbies result
in a higher likelihood of voting pro-IRCA. At the same time, labor PAC contributions do
not appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials. The size and significance of our
regressors of interest is however not affected.
Finally, we have performed several checks to assess the robustness of our results to al-
ternative econometric specifications. We display these results in Table 5. In column (1) we
start by reporting mean marginal effects from estimating a probit model, rather than a logit
model as in our main analysis. Our findings are comparable to those in our baseline results
in column (4) of Table 2.
In the presence of state fixed effects, both our logit and probit specifications use infor-
mation only from states in which all congressional representatives did not vote in the same
way. To take instead advantage of all the information available in our data – thus increasing
by approximately 15 percent the number of observations used – we report in column (2)
the results of a linear probability model. Importantly, the size and significance of our main
coefficients of interest is broadly unaffected.
42See Facchini, Frattini, and Signorotto (2013) for a similar strategy.
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As we have already discussed in Section 5, IRCA was very controversial and out of a
total of 433 members of the House,43 37 decided not to cast a ballot in favor or against the
measure. In our baseline specification we have simply omitted districts whose representative
did not vote on IRCA, but this choice might lead to biased estimates if the selection of
representatives into voting is non–random. To address this concern, we have additionally
estimated a two–step Heckman selection model and the results are reported in columns (3)
and (4). In particular, we have implemented the following specification:
V oted = Xβ + ud (14)
CastBallotd = 1 if Zγ + ed ≥ 0 (15)
where β and γ are parameter vectors, X and Z are vectors of controls (with potentially
common elements), ud and ed are normally distributed error terms and Corr(ud, ed) = ρ.
Equation 14 is the main specification, whereas equation 15 models the possible presence of
sample selection. In particular, note that V oted is observed only if CastBallotd = 1. Of
course, if ρ = 0, selection is not a concern, and equation 14 can be estimated consistently on
its own. To identify the possible effect of selection, without resorting to a functional form
restriction in the selection equation, we need to include in equation 15 at least one additional
control that is not included in equation 14 and that, conditional on X, affects the probability
of casting a ballot without directly affecting the vote on the migration initiative.
To this end, for each representative we have constructed a proxy for her propensity to cast
a ballot in that Congress, Participationd, using the share of “Yes” or “No” votes cast over
all roll call votes available, with the exclusion of those on IRCA. This variable is arguably
correlated with the probability to take part on the IRCA vote but, conditional on all other
control variables, should not have a direct effect on the likelihood to support IRCA. Columns
(3) and (4) report our findings. Focusing on the estimates of the selection equation reported
43At the time of the vote, two seats were vacant due to the death of the local representative.
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in column (4), we can immediately see that the coefficient of Participationd is positive and
strongly significant, suggesting that this variable affects the probability of casting a ballot
on migration bills. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of the inverse of the Mills’ ratio
indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias, as it is positive
and statistically significant. Still, the sign and statistical significance of our main results do
not appear to be affected (see column 3).44
8 Conclusions
We have developed a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic
trade–offs faced by an elected official in the decision to support an immigration amnesty
in the presence of a selective immigration policy. In our model we have shown that an
amnesty is more desirable the bigger is the gain to aggregate income induced by granting
legalized workers access to all the available employment opportunities. On the contrary, a
more redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable, as lower–skilled legalized
foreign workers become entitled to welfare state benefits.
We have then assessed the relevance of the drivers identified by our theoretical analysis
by studying the role played by each of them in determining the voting behavior of members
of the U.S. Congress on the IRCA legalization program. We have found strong support for
our model, obtaining results that are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.
We can think of several avenues along which our analysis could be extended. First, in our
theoretical setting the policy maker acts as a pure welfare maximizer.45 An alternative would
involve taking explicitly into account political economy forces that do play an important
role in shaping immigration policy and its enforcement. Second, our theoretical analysis has
44The sample selection model is estimated on 432 observations, even if the members of the
House at the time of the vote were 433 because the Speaker, Tip O’Neill, representative of
Massachusetts’ 8th district is coded as “not a member” of the House in Poole and Rosenthal’s
dataset for most votes of the 99th Congress, including the vote on IRCA.
45In the empirical analysis, though, we have taken into account the role that organized
pressure groups might play.
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abstracted away from the problem of aggregating individual congressmen preferences and
the possibility of strategic interactions among representatives. Clearly, coalition building in
Congress is a complex issue, as the failure of passing a comprehensive immigration policy
reform during the Obama administration has shown. While both are important questions,
we leave them for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Roll-call votes 433
Vote 396 0.581 0.494 0.000 1.000
Illegals’ over-education 435 0.089 0.213 0.000 1.000
High local fiscal leakage 435 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000
District income (thousand USD) 435 20,055 4,003 8,434 33,404
Democrat 435 0.582 0.494 0.000 1.000
Age 435 50.221 10.653 28 85
Sex 435 0.947 0.224 0.000 1.000
Representative Hispanic 435 0.025 0.157 0.000 1.000
Natives’ over-education 435 0.548 0.028 0.480 0.617
Skill ratio 435 0.161 0.064 0.041 0.430
Unemployment 435 0.067 0.025 0.019 0.219
Share of total workers employed in:
Agriculture 435 0.042 0.043 0.001 0.202
Construction 435 0.059 0.019 0.011 0.129
Manufacturing 435 0.224 0.084 0.043 0.480
Transport 435 0.044 0.014 0.020 0.117
Communication 435 0.029 0.006 0.016 0.061
Trade 435 0.204 0.022 0.130 0.261
Finance 435 0.059 0.022 0.028 0.176
Business and repair services 435 0.041 0.014 0.021 0.103
Entertainment 435 0.042 0.020 0.024 0.325
Health and Education 435 0.161 0.027 0.084 0.273
Professionals 435 0.042 0.013 0.022 0.117
Public Administration 435 0.053 0.029 0.021 0.243
Share of urban population 435 0.737 0.225 0.189 1.002
Immigrants/natives ratio 435 0.087 0.119 0.004 0.686
African American 435 0.114 0.150 0.001 0.921
Hispanic 435 0.065 0.110 0.003 0.717
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all variables included in the main specification of our analysis. All variables
are defined at the congressional district level and are extracted from the 1980 Census of population, unless otherwise specified.
Roll-call votes indicates the number of representatives who were in office and could vote on IRCA. Vote is coded as 1 if the
representative voted in favor of IRCA and 0 if he voted against. Illegals’ (natives’) over-education is the share of likely illegal
Mexican and Salvadorian workers (native workers) with a level of “quality-adjusted” education higher than the mean of natives’
education in their occupation. High local fiscal leakage is a dummy variable that identifies the districts above the mean for
both per capita revenues of local governments (from the 1982 Data Base on Historical Finances of Local Governments: “County
Area Finances”) and the share of likely illegal Mexican and Salvadorian immigrants in the total population. District income
measures the median family income within a district in thousand dollars. Age is the age of the representative. Sex is coded as
1 for female representatives, 0 otherwise. Representative Hispanic indicates whether the representative is Hispanic-American.
Democrat is coded as 1 if the representative belongs to the Democratic Party. Skill Ratio measures the percentage of the
population over 25 with at least a bachelor degree. Unemployment is the share of unemployed individuals in the total labor
force. Share of total workers employed in sector X is the fraction of total workers employed in sector X out of total employment
in the district. Share of urban population is a measure of the share of population living in urban areas. Immigrants/natives is
the ratio of foreign-born individuals to natives in the working-age (16-65) population. African American is the share of African
American individuals in the total population. Hispanic is the share of Hispanic individuals in the total population.
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Table 2: Basic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Illegals’ over-education 0.459*** 0.392** 0.435*** 0.427***
(0.169) (0.156) (0.153) (0.152)
High local fiscal leakage -0.201* -0.252*** -0.257*** -0.296***
(0.107) (0.093) (0.096) (0.100)
District income -0.004 0.009 -0.025* -0.037**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.019)
Democrat 0.379*** 0.386*** 0.388***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.045)
Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sex -0.063 -0.038 -0.024
(0.115) (0.115) (0.117)
Representative Hispanic -0.153 -0.043 0.015
(0.132) (0.184) (0.194)
Natives’ over-education 2.999** 2.751*
(1.351) (1.487)
African American -0.503* -0.560*
(0.266) (0.321)
Hispanic -0.62 -0.699
(0.487) (0.537)
Share of urban population 0.463** 0.574*
(0.196) (0.313)
Immigrants/natives ratio 0.152 0.06
(0.368) (0.464)
Skill ratio 1.261* 2.042
(0.687) (1.387)
Unemployment -1.227 -1.465
(2.099) (2.122)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition No No No Yes
N 347 347 347 347
Notes: The table reports mean marginal effects from a logit model for the probability of voting in favor of IRCA.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See notes in Table 1 for the definition of the variables.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 3: Alternative definitions of key regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Illegals’ over-education 0.427*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.435***
(0.152) (0.154) (0.155) (0.153)
Illegals’ over-education (above the median) 0.306*
(0.164)
Alternative illegals’ over-education 1 0.356**
(0.172)
Alternative illegals’ over-education 2 0.369*
(0.188)
High local fiscal leakage -0.296*** -0.279*** -0.297*** -0.298*** -0.296***
(0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
Alternative high local fiscal leakage 1 -0.214**
(0.094)
Alternative high local fiscal leakage 2 -0.262**
(0.112)
District income -0.037** -0.035* -0.040** -0.039** -0.039** -0.038**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Alternative district income -0.018
(0.015)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Natives’ over-education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Representative characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic, demographic and ethnic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 347 347 347 347 347 347 347
Notes: The table reports mean marginal effects from a logit model for the probability of voting in favor of IRCA. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
See notes in Table 1 for the definition of main variables. Illegals’ over-education (above the median) is the share of likely illegal Mexican and Salvadorian workers
with a level of quality-adjusted education higher than the the median of natives’ education in their occupation. Alternative illegals’ over-education - 1 and 2 are
the baseline over-education indices, computed with a higher discount rate for education in country of origin (0.790 and 0.765, respectively). Alternative high local
fiscal leakage 1 (2) is a dummy variable that identifies the districts above the mean (75th percentile) per capita revenues of local governments and above the
75th percentile (mean) of the distribution of the share of likely illegal Mexican and Salvadorian immigrants in the total population. Alternative district income
measures the mean family income within a district in thousand dollars.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 4: Alternative control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Illegals’ over-education 0.413*** 0.459*** 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.425*** 0.427*** 0.445*** 0.429*** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.469***
(0.143) (0.152) (0.153) (0.156) (0.155) (0.152) (0.171) (0.152) (0.152) (0.152) (0.157)
High local fiscal leakage -0.369*** -0.340*** -0.299*** -0.291*** -0.273*** -0.286*** -0.322*** -0.310*** -0.296*** -0.401** -0.350***
(0.099) (0.096) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.102) (0.100) (0.104) (0.100) (0.189) (0.105)
District income -0.040** -0.039** -0.037* -0.014 -0.038* -0.036* -0.038* -0.039** -0.037** -0.036* -0.037*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Democrat 0.410*** 0.366*** 0.384*** 0.388*** 0.383*** 0.390*** 0.388*** 0.385*** 0.378***
(0.078) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.054)
DW Nominate -0.747***
(0.074)
ADA score 0.008***
(0.001)
Share of democratic votes -0.060
(0.173)
Skill ratio 2.197 1.565 1.981 2.130 1.837 2.113 2.042 1.91 2.245
(1.374) (1.346) (1.395) (1.397) (1.379) (1.393) (1.387) (1.399) (1.544)
Alternative skill ratio -0.202
(0.778)
Occupational skill ratio 2.445
(1.714)
Immigrants/natives ratio 0.147 0.408 0.051 0.045 0.033 0.067 0.023 0.06 0.066 0.289
(0.475) (0.502) (0.462) (0.461) (0.455) (0.465) (0.464) (0.464) (0.463) (0.471)
Log natives -0.261
(0.589)
Log immigrants -0.041
(0.096)
Illegals/natives education ratio 0.180
(0.168)
Hispanic -0.967* -1.195** -0.689 -0.686 -0.656 -0.642 -0.696 -0.763 -0.699 -0.715 -1.048*
(0.520) (0.538) (0.538) (0.565) (0.528) (0.547) (0.531) (0.551) (0.537) (0.539) (0.568)
Share of likely illegals 1.429
(3.151)
State fiscal spillover -0.199
(0.227)
Alternative state fiscal spillover -3.552
(5.592)
PacLabor 0.021
(0.071)
PacCorporate 0.178***
(0.067)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Natives’ over-education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Representative characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic, demographic and ethnic
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 347 345 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 347 322
Notes: The table reports mean marginal effects from a logit model for the probability of voting in favor of IRCA. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. See notes in Table 1 for the definition of main
variables. In columns (1) and (2) we use alternative measures of the ideological orientation of the representative and replace Democrat with DW - nominate score, which is the normalized DW nominate score
(column (1)) and with the ADA score (column (2)). In column (3) we additionally control for the share of Democratic votes in the last congressional election. In columns (4) and (5) we use alternative measures
of a district’s Skill ratio and replace skill ratio with Alternative skill ratio, the ratio of high school graduates and college graduates to high school dropouts (column 4) and with Occupational skill ratio, the ratio
of individuals employed in high versus low skilled occupations (column 5). In column (6) we replace the Immigrants/natives ratio in the district’s working age population with Log natives and Log immigrants,
the logarithm of the number of native and immigrant residents in the same age range. In column (7) we control for the ratio between the quality-adjusted mean years of education of illegal immigrants and
of natives in each district, and also include a dummy variable to identify districts where there are no observations on illegal immigrants. In column (8), we control for the share of illegals in the district. In
column (9) and (10) we control in two alternative ways for the extent of fiscal spillovers at the state level. In column (11) we control for PACLabor and PACCorporate which are measures of the intensity of
the lobbying activity and take a value of one if the labor/corporate contributions that the representative received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all labor/corporate contributions in that year, and
zero otherwise.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Table 5: Alternative estimation techniques
Probit LPM
Sample selection model
Main Selection
Illegals’ over-education 0.426*** 0.335*** 0.291** -3.332***
(0.148) (0.112) (0.119) (0.936)
High local fiscal leakage -0.287*** -0.260** -0.266*** -0.724
(0.099) (0.104) (0.091) (1.474)
District income -0.036* -0.029 -0.031* -0.402*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.237)
Inverse Mills’ Ratio 0.244*
(0.147)
Participation 32.872***
(7.768)
State dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Natives’ over-education Yes Yes Yes Yes
Representative
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic, demographic
and ethnic characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 347 396 432 432
Notes: The table reports results from three different econometric models for the probability of voting in favor of
IRCA. Column (1) reports mean marginal effects from a probit model. Column (2) shows results from a linear
probability model. Column (3) displays the results from the two-stage estimation of a Heckman sample selection
model, and column (4) reports the results of the corresponding selection equation. Participation measures the share
of roll call votes the representative has participated into, except for the vote on IRCA, during her term in office in
the 99th Congress.
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
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Figure 1: The distribution of migrants j and firms i
44
Figure 2: Correlation between IRCA applicants and stock of Mexican and Salvadorian
immigrants in congressional district
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Figure 3: Florida’s 99th Congress Congressional districts and IRCA vote
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Figure 4: California’s 99th Congress Congressional districts and IRCA vote
47
